The transcendence of existence and the illusion’s problem

Abstract

Heidegger conceives of the being that we are, exist (Dasein), using the expression "being-in-theworld," which would express the constitutive transcendence of this being. In elaborating the meaning of this expression, Heidegger engages with a philosophical position that we call "modern interpretation." Broadly speaking, this interpretation understands our being as a subject that can, at least by right, subsist independently and separately from other entities. Given this independence and separation, the question then arises as to whether and to what extent the subject can have access to other(s) being(s) beyond itself, that is, whether and to what extent the subject transcends its "interiority" towards something that would be external to it. In this sense, transcendence could be something that may or may not happen to the subject. For this transcendence to occur, in turn, it is necessary that something subsists outside the subject. The problem of the existence (or non-existence) of the external world then arises. This article aims to present Heidegger's understanding of being-inthe-world as transcendence of Dasein in order to consider how, within the framework of existential analytics, one can deal with what is perhaps the main argument in favor of the relevance of the problem of the external world: the problem of illusion, on the basis of which modern interpretation questions the very subsistence of beings beyond the representations that the subject holds in their consciousness.