WORLD-VIEW AND WORLD-PICTURE IN WITTGENSTEIN

Abstract

The present work aims to establish a possible relationship between two important concepts in Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, formulated in distinct contexts of the author's reflections, namely, the concept of world-view (Weltanschauung) and that of world-picture (Weltbild). The first concept—world-view—appears in paragraph 122 of Philosophical Investigations, in the context of presenting the notion of a surveyable representation, which, in turn, constitutes the core of his philosophical method. If philosophy, as conceived by the author, is an activity aimed at dissolving philosophical problems arising from a misunderstanding of how language operates, then it must enable the broadest possible understanding of the limits of meaning constitution and the conditions of possibility for signification. To this end, its task must be to bring to light the various connections between concepts, and the very idea of a surveyable representation of such interconnections is recognized by the philosopher as an attitude that, above all, could characterize a Weltanschauung, that is, the way we see things. The second concept – world-picture – emerges in the discussions of On Certainty and denotes the system of our fundamental beliefs (the certainties that are beyond doubt), which, in essence, constitutes the very background for the constitution of meaning in our practices in the world, including our world-views. Thus, the task undertaken here—exploring the meaning of each concept and then deepening the relationship between them—can help to understand, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, our own relationship with reality and the way we interpret our experiences of the world.