Theory of Intentional Systems: Mother Nature in face of mental content

a mãe-natureza face ao conteúdo mental

Abstract

The success of an analytical endeavor can be measured by the consequences in the structuring of new ideas and new arrangements. This occurs with the concept of intentional systems (IS) - the physical posture, the planning posture and the intentional posture - by Daniel C. Dennett, which contributes to the presence and location of beliefs that shape decision-making with congruent thinking tools, in continuity with the tree of life present in Mother Nature, contrary to what its critics postulate. Dennett proposes deep understanding from “our mother’s lap” or from evolutionary action; and I dare suggest the most prominent apprehension of our Mother-Nature. The attempt interposed in its philosophical scope is to carry tools capable of dispelling the extent to which some “human” attributes are treated as an uncertain, doubtful and imponderable matter that can be scrutinized by reverse engineering. The parts can reveal the whole process of aboutness, that of attributing beliefs and desires to the forming layers of mental content; but to prevent or obstruct spiritualist speculations. Important: the Dennettian model can lead to the inference that differences in understanding and thinking are a matter of degree. And the fundamental difference lies in the ability to perceive and discover regularities, a cognitive ability that differentiates us from other beings. IS are tools that elucidate the different behaviors present in the environment surrounding us. It encourages us to perceive important signals in the environment, but without them we will be able to infer and undertake little. What opens a productive path for practical reasoning, unquestionably proves why such epistemic tools have had recurrent use in several areas such as cognitive ethology. We briefly delve into this structuring, without discerning criticisms of the model, to point out the contributions of the reinsertion of intentionality, proposed by Dennett, as a product of mechanisms of such intentional systems.